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Abstract 
People spontaneously produce gestures during speaking and thinking. We focus 
here on gestures that depict or indicate information related to the contents of concurrent 
speech or thought (i.e., representational gestures). Previous research indicates that such 
gestures have not only communicative functions, but also self-oriented cognitive 
functions. In this paper, we propose a new theoretical framework, the Gesture-for-
Conceptualization Hypothesis, which explains the self-oriented functions of 
representational gestures. According to this framework, representational gestures affect 
cognitive processes in four main ways: gestures activate, manipulate, package and 
explore spatio-motoric representations for speaking and thinking. These four functions 
are shaped by gesture’s ability to schematize information, that is, to focus on a small 
subset of available information that is potentially relevant to the task at hand. The 
framework is based on the assumption that gestures are generated from the same system 
that generates practical actions, such as object manipulation; however, gestures are 
distinct from practical actions in that they represent information. The framework 
provides a novel, parsimonious and comprehensive account of the self-oriented 
functions of gestures. We discuss how the framework accounts for gestures that depict 
abstract or metaphoric content, and we consider implications for the relations between 
self-oriented and communicative functions of gestures. 
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How Do Gestures Influence Thinking and Speaking? 
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis  
 
People spontaneously produce gestures during speaking and thinking. Gestures 
play an important role in communication (Hostetter, 2011; Kendon, 1994), as speech and 
gesture jointly express the speaker’s message in a coordinated way (Kendon, 2004; 
Streeck, 2009). Thus, gesture production is partly motivated by speakers’ desire to 
enhance communication. However, a growing body of evidence shows that gesture 
production also affects gesturers’ own cognitive processes and representations; that is, 
gestures also have self-oriented functions. The goal of this article is to outline a 
theoretical account of the self-oriented functions of gestures. 
Theories of embodied cognition argue that human cognitive processes are rooted 
in the actions of human bodies in the physical world (Shapiro, 2014; Wilson, 2002). 
According to this perspective, cognitive processes are rooted in perception and action. 
We argue here that gestures are closely linked to practical actions, as they are generated 
from the same system. Moreover, gestures are physical actions of a special type, that is, 
representational actions. As such, gesture is involved in cognitive processes in important 
ways, which we describe herein. 
There is wide agreement in the literature that gestures can be categorized into 
several subtypes (Efron, 1941; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; McNeill, 1992; 2005). Most 
research on the self-oriented functions of gestures focuses on representational gestures 
(though see Krahmer & Swerts, 2007, on beat gestures). Representational gestures are 
generally defined as gestures that depict action, motion or shape, or that indicate location 
or trajectory. For example, as a speaker says, "she throws a ball", she might enact a 
throwing motion with her hand, or as she says, “the ball hit the wall and bounced back", 
she might trace the trajectory of the ball with her finger. Representational gestures may 
also metaphorically represent abstract concepts. For example, while saying “an opinion", 
a speaker might make a cup-like shape with his palm facing upward as if to hold an 
object, thus metaphorically representing an opinion as a graspable object. 
Representational gestures include iconic gestures, metaphoric gestures and deictic 
gestures in the taxonomy described by McNeill (1992), and they are roughly equivalent 
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to pantomimes, physiographic, ideographic, and deictic gestures in the system described 
by Efron (1941). Throughout this paper, we use the term “gesture” to refer specifically to 
representational gestures. 
Gesture for Conceptualization 
What function do gestures serve for the person who produces them? Existing 
hypotheses regarding the self-oriented functions of gestures focus on how gestures 
facilitate speaking. Several distinct hypotheses have been proposed. First, the Lexical 
Retrieval Hypothesis holds that speakers’ gestures serve to increase activation on items in 
their mental lexicons, therefore facilitating lexical access (Hadar & Butterworth, 1997; 
Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000; Rauscher, Krauss, & Chen, 1996). According to this 
view, a gesture may activate spatial features that are a part of the semantic representation 
of a lexical item, and in so doing, prime retrieval of that lexical item. Second, the Image 
Activation Hypothesis (de Ruiter, 1998; Freedman, 1977; Hadar & Butterworth, 1997) 
holds that gesture maintains visuo-spatial imagery. Because gesture prevents imagery 
from decaying, the speech production process has better quality information to inspect. 
Third, the Information Packaging Hypothesis holds that gesture helps speakers package 
spatio-motoric information into units appropriate for verbal encoding (Kita, 2000). When 
communicating complex information, one needs to break the information down into 
chunks of a size manageable for the speech production process. One important planning 
unit for speech production is the clause (Bock & Cutting, 1992); thus, gestures help 
chunk information into units that can be encoded in a clause. Fourth, the Cognitive Load 
Reduction Hypothesis (Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Wagner, 
Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004) holds that gesture reduces the amount of cognitive 
resources needed for formulating speech. The scope of all of these theories is limited to 
speech production; however, a growing body of literature suggests that gesture’s function 
in cognition goes beyond speaking.  
There is abundant evidence that gesture is involved, not only in speaking, but in 
learning and problem solving. When people explain their solutions to problems or think 
aloud as they solve, they often use gestures to highlight spatio-motoric representations 
(e.g., Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010) or to express spatial strategies (e.g., Alibali, 
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Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011). Gestures can introduce new strategies into people's 
repertoires of strategies (Goldin-Meadow, Cook, & Mitchell, 2009), bring out implicit 
knowledge in problem solving (Broaders, Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2007), and 
lead to lasting learning (Cook, Mitchell & Goldin-Meadow, 2008). Some researchers 
have argued that gesture facilitates learning by reducing learners’ cognitive load (Goldin-
Meadow & Wagner, 2005). 
People spontaneously gesture not only when they talk about their problem-solving 
processes (co-speech gestures), but also when they solve problems silently (co-thought 
gestures) (Schwartz & Black, 1996; Hegarty, Mayer, Kriz, & Keehener, 2005)1. Similar 
to co-speech gestures, these self-oriented co-thought gestures can reflect problem solving 
strategies (Alibali, Spencer et al., 2011) and enhance problem solving performance (Chu 
& Kita, 2011). Moreover, there is evidence that co-speech and co-thought gestures are 
produced from the same underlying mechanism (Chu & Kita, 2015). Here, we propose 
that both co-speech and co-thought gestures have the same self-oriented functions. 
We present a new theoretical framework, the Gesture-for-Conceptualization 
Hypothesis, which proposes a role for gesture in both speaking and thinking. This new 
account places gesture in a more central position in human cognition, in contrast to 
accounts that focus only on the role of gesture in either language production or problem 
solving. We propose that gesture shapes the way people conceptualize information 
through four functions. The key theses of the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis 
are (1) gesture activates, manipulates, packages and explores spatio-motoric 
representations for the purposes of speaking and thinking, (2) gesture schematizes 
information, and this schematization process shapes these four functions.  
According to the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, gesture influences 
conceptualization in the sense that it affects the contents of thought in four ways. First, 
people use gestures to activate spatio-motoric representations (e.g., Alibali & Kita, 2010). 
When there is a choice between using spatio-motoric representations vs. other more 
                                                 
1 “Co-thought” gestures do not include “silent gestures” (Goldin-Meadow & 
Brentari, 2016), which are produced for communicative purposes when speech is not 
available. 
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abstract representations for speaking or thinking, producing gestures encourages people 
to rely more on spatio-motoric representations. Second, people use gestures to 
manipulate spatio-motoric representations (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011). Just as people use 
actions to manipulate objects, people can use gestures to manipulate spatio-motoric 
representations. Third, people use gesture to package spatio-motoric information into 
units useful for other cognitive operations. For example, when verbally expressing 
complex ideas, information needs to be linearized into small chunks, each of which can 
be verbally encoded in a clause. Gesture facilitates this process (e.g., Mol & Kita, 2012). 
Fourth, people use gesture to explore various possibilities for what information to focus 
on in activities that involve rich or complex spatio-motoric information. Finally, we 
maintain that four functions depend on gestures being schematic representations, which 
focus on a small subset of information that is potentially relevant to the task at hand (Chu 
& Kita, 2008; de Ruiter, 2000; Goldin-Meadow, 2015; Novack, Congdon, Hemani-
Lopez, & Goldin-Meadow, 2014). 
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis is based on our view of how 
gestures are generated—that is, the mechanism that gives rise to gestures. Unlike some 
theories that embed gesture generation within speech production processes (e.g., de 
Ruiter, 2000; McNeill, 2005), we propose that gestures are generated from the processes 
that also generate practical actions (e.g., grasping a cup to drink; Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008; Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Kita, 2014), and therefore, gestures share some 
properties with practical actions (Chu & Kita, 2015). Because thinking in terms of action 
has different properties from propositional or verbal thinking, gesture offers possibilities 
and perspectives that propositional or verbal thinking cannot, and therefore, gesture 
affects thinking in particular ways.  
In the following sections, we describe the evidence for each of the four functions. 
We then consider how these functions are shaped by gesture schematizing information.  
In considering evidence for the role of gesture in cognition, it is valuable to 
distinguish issues of mechanism and function, drawing on the Aristotelian distinction 
between efficient cause and final cause. Efficient cause or mechanism is the process or 
operation that gives rise to a behavior, and final cause or function is the purpose that a 
behavior serves, or the consequence that a behavior brings about (see Hladký & 
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Havlíček, 2013, for discussion). The most direct evidence for self-oriented functions of 
gestures comes from studies that demonstrate cognitive consequences of gesture by 
experimentally manipulating gesture production (e.g., by encouraging or prohibiting 
gesture). Less direct evidence comes from studies of the mechanisms that give rise to 
gestures. For example, some studies experimentally manipulate the difficulty of cognitive 
processes, and demonstrate that specific types of difficulty give rise to more gestures. 
Such findings suggest that gestures may be produced to facilitate the cognitive processes 
under study. Though indirect, this type of evidence is important because it can disconfirm 
hypotheses about self-oriented functions of gesture and inform us about what processes 
may benefit from gesture, complementing findings from studies that experimentally 
manipulate gesture production. In the following sections on the four functions of 
gestures, we first briefly present indirect evidence from studies on mechanism, and then 
present more direct evidence from studies that manipulated gesture production. 
Gesture Activates Spatio-motoric Representations 
According to the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, producing gestures 
increases the activation level of spatio-motoric representations during speaking and 
thinking. This can occur in two ways. First, gestures can help maintain the activation of 
spatio-motoric representations that are already active, so that these representations do 
not decay during speaking or thinking (de Ruiter, 1998; Hadar & Butterworth, 1997; 
Wesp, Hesse, Keutmann, & Wheaton, 2001). Second, gestures can activate new spatio-
motoric representations—ones that were not previously active—and this can, in turn, 
change the content of speech or thought (see also Hostetter & Boncoddo, in press). Two 
lines of evidence, which we review below, support these claims. First, people produce 
more gestures when maintaining pre-existing spatio-motoric representations is 
challenging. Such findings provide suggestive but not definitive evidence that gesture 
activates spatio-motoric representations. Second, as shown in studies that 
experimentally manipulate gesture production, producing gestures promotes the 
expression and use of new spatio-motoric information in speaking and problem solving. 
Such findings provide more direct, definitive evidence for this function of gesture. 
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Difficulty in Maintaining Spatio-motoric Representations Triggers Gesture 
Several studies have shown that people produce more gestures when it is more 
difficult to maintain pre-existing spatio-motoric representations. For example, adults 
produce more gestures when describing line drawings or paintings from memory than 
when describing them with the stimuli visible (de Ruiter, 1998; Morsella & Krauss, 
2004; Wesp et al., 2001). Along similar lines, children gesture more when they need to 
maintain spatial information in memory, such as when asked to remember the location 
of a toy (Delgado, Gomez, & Sarria, 2011).  
Gesture Production Promotes Activation of Spatio-Motoric Representations  
Experiments in which gesture production is manipulated—for example, by 
prohibiting gesture—provide strong evidence that gesture activates spatio-motoric 
representations. Two types of effects have been reported: gesture maintains pre-existing 
spatio-motoric representations (i.e., helps them resist decay) and gesture activates new 
spatio-motoric representations that were not previously active. We review evidence for 
each of these effects, in turn.  
Producing gestures maintains activation of pre-existing spatio-motoric 
representations. So and colleagues (2014) asked participants to remember a route on a 
diagram representing streets. During the retention period, participants rehearsed the 
route by silently gesturing or by visualizing it while holding a softball in each hand 
(prohibiting hand movements). Participants recalled the route better when they gestured 
than when they visualized without moving their hands. Thus, gesture helped maintain 
their pre-existing representation of the route. 
Producing gestures also activates new spatio-motoric representations. When 
people have a choice between using spatio-motoric vs. non-spatio-motoric 
representations, gesture production promotes the use of spatio-motoric representations. 
That is, when people are free to choose the content of their speech, gestures activate 
spatio-motoric representations that were not previously active, leading people to express 
more spatio-motoric content in speech. For example, in conversational interactions, the 
imagistic content of speech is greater when people are allowed to gesture than when 
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they are not (Rime, Shiaratura, Hupet & Ghysselinckx,1984); people choose to talk 
about spatio-motoric content when they are free to gesture.  
In problem solving, people also rely more on spatio-motoric information when 
allowed to gesture. For example, in explaining Piagetian conservation tasks, children 
who are allowed to gesture tend to invoke perceptual features of the tasks (such as the 
heights, widths, or shapes of the task objects), whereas those who are not allowed to 
gesture often focus on non-perceptually-present aspects of the situation, such as the 
initial equality of the quantities (Alibali & Kita, 2010). As a second example, when 
adults predict which direction a specific gear in a gear configuration will move, people 
who are allowed to gesture often rely on a strategy that involves simulating the 
movements of the gears, whereas those prohibited from gesturing are more likely to rely 
on an abstract strategy, based on the number of gears (e.g., if the number of gears is 
odd, the final gear in the row will turn in the same direction as the first gear; Alibali, 
Spencer, et al, 2011). Thus, gesture helps participants to generate simulations of the 
gears’ movements. Taken together, these findings suggest that gesture activates new 
spatio-motoric representations, leading people to focus on spatio-motoric information in 
their explanations and their solution strategies.  
Gesture can also activate new spatio-motoric information when people talk 
about abstract ideas, such as metaphors. Many metaphors are grounded in physical 
actions or spatial relationships (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and gesture facilitates the 
mapping between these spatio-motoric concepts and their metaphorical meanings. For 
example, when asked to explain the metaphorical mappings underlying phrases such as 
"spill the beans" (e.g., beans represent secrets, spilling represents dispersion of 
information), participants described the mappings for more components of the metaphor 
and in more detail when encouraged to gesture than when prohibited from gesturing 
(Argyriou & Kita, 2013; Argyriou, Mohr & Kita, in press). Producing gestures 
generated spatio-motoric information based on the literal meanings (e.g., “spilling”), 
and facilitated participants’ mappings between the literal concepts and the abstract 
meanings (e.g., “dispersion [of information]”).  
Gestures can also support abstract reasoning by activating new spatio-motoric 
representations that concretize or spatialize abstract ideas. For example, Beaudoin-Ryan 
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and Goldin-Meadow (2014) asked fifth graders to judge which of two choices in moral 
dilemmas (e.g., cheating vs. stealing) was worse. During their responses to probe 
questions, children were either encouraged to gesture, prohibited from gesturing, or 
allowed to gesture spontaneously. Children sometimes expressed multiple perspectives 
in gestures, using two-handed gestures that located two individuals in different locations 
in gesture space, and they did so especially frequently in the gesture-encouraged 
condition. Crucially, children in the gesture-encouraged condition also expressed 
multiple perspectives most often in their speech, followed by children in the gesture-
allowed group and then those in the gesture-prohibited group2. Thus, when multiple 
perspectives could be simultaneously “spatialized” in gesture, it was easier for children 
to incorporate multiple perspectives in their verbal statements about moral issues. Thus, 
activating spatio-motoric representations for abstract concepts via gesture led to a shift 
in participants’ reasoning. 
Taken together, these findings make a strong case that producing gestures 
activates both pre-existing and new spatio-motoric representations, which are in turn 
used in speaking and thinking. In this way, gesture can change the course of speaking 
and thinking.  
Gesture Manipulates Spatio-motoric Information 
When speaking or solving problems, people often need to mentally manipulate 
spatio-motoric information. For example, one might need to rearrange, translate, rotate, 
invert, or take a new perspective on the objects one is speaking or thinking about. 
According to the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, people can use gesture to 
manipulate spatio-motoric representations. There are two lines of evidence for this 
view. The first, suggestive line of evidence shows that when manipulation is difficult, 
people produce more gestures. The second, more direct line of evidence indicates that 
producing gestures improves manipulation performance.  
                                                 
2 The study has three phases, pre-test, manipulation, post-test, but here we focus 
on the results concerning the manipulation phase. 
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Difficulty in Manipulating Spatio-Motoric Representations Triggers Gesture 
Suggestive evidence that gesture manipulates spatio-motoric representations 
comes from people’s behavior in solving spatial transformation problems, such as mental 
rotation tasks (for an example, see Figure 1). People spontaneously produce gestures 
when they solve such problems, both when solving while talking aloud and when solving 
silently (Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011; Ehrlich, Levine, & Goldin-Meadow, 2006), and they 
gesture more when the problems are more difficult (Chu & Kita, 2011). Along similar 
lines, people gesture at a higher rate when describing a figure that they must mentally 
rotate than when describing that same figure without rotation (Hostetter, Alibali, & 
Bartholomew, 2011).  
Another source of suggestive evidence comes from people skilled at using the 
abacus for calculation. When calculating without an abacus, skilled abacus users often 
produce hand movements resembling abacus manipulation (Hatano, Miyake, & Binks, 
1977), and they do so more often for more difficult problems (Brooks, Barner, Frank, & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2014).  
Gesture Production Affects Manipulation of Spatio-Motoric Information 
Studies in which the availability of gesture is manipulated experimentally provide 
more direct evidence that gesture functions to manipulate spatio-motoric representations. 
Several studies have provided evidence of this sort. 
Encouraging gesture promotes an aspect of spatial skill termed penetrative 
thinking, which is the ability to visualize and reason about the interior structure of 
object, based on observing the object’s surface (Atit, Gagnier & Shipley, 2015). 
Penetrative thinking requires taking a new perspective on a spatial representation; for 
example, geoscientists might reason about how a visible rock outcropping extends 
below the surface of the earth. In Atit and colleagues’ study, participants were asked to 
explain how they would build three-dimensional versions of geologic block diagrams 
using playdough, and they described the resulting cross-sections. Participants who were 
asked to use their hands as they explained showed greater improvement on a posttest of 
penetrative thinking than did participants who were asked to sit on their hands while 
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explaining. Thus, gesture improved participants’ internal computation of the spatial 
transformations involved in creating the structures depicted in the diagrams. 
Encouraging people to produce co-thought gestures improves their performance 
in mental rotation tasks. Chu and Kita (2011) instructed participants to solve two blocks 
of identical mental rotation problems while alone in a room, and without speaking. In 
each problem, participants judged whether the lower object was rotated from the upper 
left or the upper right object (see Figure 1). The availability of gesture during problem 
solving was manipulated in the first block of trials. Participants who were encouraged to 
gesture produced more gestures and solved more problems correctly than participants 
who did not receive any instructions about gesture (and who therefore produced fewer 
gestures) or participants who were prohibited from gesturing. Thus, gesture enhanced 
participants’ abilities to perform spatial transformations involved in mental rotation.  
In the second block, all participants were prohibited from gesturing while solving 
the same mental rotation problems. Participants who had been encouraged to gesture in 
the first block still solved more problems correctly than participants in the other 
conditions. Thus, gesture did not simply offload the intermediate representation of the 
stimulus objects in working memory to the hands—instead, gesture had a lasting impact, 
improving how people mentally transformed spatial information. Based on their rich 
experience of hand-object interaction and gestural representation of such interaction, 
participants could effectively simulate the rotation of an object and the visual 
consequences of the rotation, making the judgment more accurate. 
Gesture also helps skilled abacus users to manipulate an imaginary abacus when 
they calculate without a physical abacus (Hatano et al., 1977). When hand movements 
of skilled abacus users were prohibited during mental calculation (without the abacus), 
they were less accurate in their calculations. These co-thought gestures helped abacus 
users mentally simulate abacus calculation, and prohibiting such gestures made the 
simulation less effective.  
Taken together, experimental evidence from studies of penetrative thinking, 
mental rotation and abacus calculation support the view that gesture functions to 
manipulate spatio-motoric information. 
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Gesture Packages Spatio-motoric Information 
When verbally expressing complex information, a single utterance or clause is 
often insufficient; information may need to be distributed across multiple utterances or 
multiple clauses. The information has to be packaged into units that can readily be 
processed within a single processing cycle for speech production (Kita, 2000; Alibali, 
Yeo, Hostetter, & Kita, in press; termed "conceptualization" for speaking in Levelt's 
[1989] speech production model). In thinking and problem solving, information may 
need to be packaged into units for cognitive processing, as well.  
According to the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, gesture helps people 
package spatio-motoric representations into units that are appropriate and useful for the 
task at hand. When complex information (e.g., the shape of a vase) is gesturally 
expressed, a single gesture may not be able to express all relevant aspects of the 
information, and each gesture may then focus on a particular aspect (e.g., the shape of the 
opening, the contour outline from a particular viewpoint). What is expressed by a gesture 
may be determined by affordances (Gibson, 1979) of the referent (Chu & Kita, 2015; 
Masson-Carro, Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2015) or by other top-down factors (e.g., an 
experimental manipulation of what to express in gestures, Goldin-Meadow, Cook, & 
Mitchell, 2009). When gesture selects a particular aspect of complex information, this 
information chunk can be used as a unit for utterance planning or for other forms of 
cognitive processing.  
There are two lines of evidence that gesture helps people package spatio-motoric 
information. The first, suggestive line of evidence shows that when information 
packaging is difficult, people produce more gestures. The second, more direct line of 
evidence is that producing gestures affects how information is packaged for speaking and 
thinking.  
Difficulty in Information Packaging Triggers Gesture 
Several studies have investigated how speakers’ gesture production varies when 
the difficulty of information packaging is manipulated. In the earliest study of this sort 
(Alibali, Kita & Young, 2000), children saw one of two identical objects being physically 
transformed (e.g., water in a tall, thin glass poured into a shallow, wide glass), as in 
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Piagetian conservation tasks. In the description condition, children described how the two 
task objects looked different. In the explanation condition, children judged whether the 
quantities were the same, and explained that judgment. Information packaging was more 
difficult in the explanation task because the information expressed needed to align with 
the quantity judgement. Children produced verbal utterances with comparable content in 
the two conditions (e.g., "this one is tall, and this one is short"). However, they produced 
gestures that represented properties of the task objects more often in the explanation 
condition than in the description condition. Thus, more difficult information packaging 
triggered more gestures, even when the verbal utterances were comparable. 
Similar effects of information packaging difficulty on gesture production have 
been observed in adults as well as children (Hostetter, Alibali, & Kita, 2007; Kita & 
Davies, 2009; Melinger & Kita, 2007). In each of these studies, participants described 
visually presented figures, and information packaging difficulty was manipulated by 
varying characteristics of the figures (see Figure 2). In each study, it was easier for 
participants to decide what information to encode in each utterance for easy figures than 
for hard figures. Across all three studies, participants produced comparable utterances for 
both types of figures, but they gestured more for the hard figures than for the easy 
figures. Thus, more challenging information packaging triggers gestures.  
Gesture Production Affects Information Packaging in Speaking and Thinking 
Studies in which gestures are manipulated experimentally provide more direct 
evidence that gesture functions to package spatio-motoric representations into units 
appropriate for speaking and thinking. Two studies have provided such evidence. 
When the information encoded in gesture is manipulated, information packaging 
in the concurrent speech changes accordingly. To study this issue, Mol and Kita (2012) 
asked participants to describe motion events (e.g., an object rolls down the hill) that 
involve both manner (e.g., roll) and path (e.g., down). In the separate gesture condition, 
participants were told to produce a gesture that depicted manner (e.g., to rotate the hand 
repeatedly in one location) and a separate gesture that depicted path (e.g., to sweep the 
hand diagonally downward) during the description. In the conflated gesture condition, 
participants were told to produce a gesture that depicted manner and path simultaneously 
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in a single movement (e.g., to move the hand diagonally downward, while rotating the 
hand repeatedly). Participants produced single-clause descriptions (e.g., "it rolled down 
the hill") more often in the conflated-gesture condition than in the separate-gesture 
condition, and they produced two-clause descriptions (e.g., "it went down / as it rolled") 
more often in the separate-gesture condition than in the conflated-gesture condition. 
Thus, changing the way gestures packaged information changed how the information was 
packaged into clauses, which are planning units in speech production (Bock & Cutting, 
1992). This finding indicates that gestural packaging of information shapes what 
information is encoded in each planning cycle for speech production (see also Kita & 
Özyürek, 2003). 
One other study suggests that the content of gesture shapes information 
packaging for thinking. Goldin-Meadow, Cook and Mitchell (2009) asked children to 
solve math equations such as 2 + 3 + 7 = _ + 7, and instructed them to produce gestures 
that encoded either a correct problem-solving strategy (a V-shaped two-finger point at 2 
and 3, and then an index finger point at the blank) or a partially correct strategy (a V-
shaped point at 3 and 7, and then an index finger point at the blank). At posttest, 
children in the correct strategy condition performed better than those in the partially 
correct strategy condition, and this effect was mediated by the extent to which strategies 
were expressed in speech at posttest. That is, gesturally expressing a particular solution 
strategy during the lesson helped participants to package relevant pieces of information 
about equations, which they verbally expressed in the posttest and used in solving the 
problems correctly. 
Taken together, this experimental evidence supports the claim that gesture 
functions to package spatio-motoric information, both for speaking and for thinking.  
Gesture Explores Spatio-Motoric Information 
When solving a problem, one often needs to find information that leads to a 
solution. The challenge is to find relevant information among the many pieces of 
information that may or may not be useful. This challenge is similar when verbally 
expressing complex information; one needs to find the optimal way to encode and 
integrate information, from among many possibilities.  
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According to the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, people can use 
gesture to explore spatio-motoric information that may be useful for the task at hand 
(Alibali et al., 2000; Kita, 2000). Four lines of evidence converge to build a case for this 
function of gesture. The first, suggestive line of evidence shows that difficult tasks trigger 
gestural exploration. The second, more direct line of evidence shows that people display 
a wider range of conceptualizations for problems when gesture is allowed than when it is 
prohibited, suggesting that gesture helps them to explore a wider range of options. The 
third line of evidence indicates that trial and error processes, which are a form of 
exploration, can take place in gesture. Speakers sometimes abandon gestures that they 
initiate, and the distribution of these abandoned gestures suggests that they are used for 
“trying out” ideas. The fourth line of evidence comes from qualitative case studies 
demonstrating how ideas develop in gestural “trial and error.” Speakers sometimes try 
out ideas in gesture that they do not express in speech; as their utterances unfold, 
speakers eventually find or create a gestural representation that they then express in 
speech. 
Difficult Tasks Trigger Exploration in Gesture 
When exploring optimal ideas for solving a problem, the search is more effective 
when covering a wider range of ideas. Gesture can do so by "casting its net" in a different 
part of the conceptual space than verbal or propositional thinking (Kita, 2000). People, 
indeed, often express some information uniquely in gesture (i.e., not in the accompanying 
speech) when explaining solutions to difficult problems. Such “gesture-speech 
mismatches” can occur when children explain their solutions to equations such as 2 + 3 + 
7 = __ + 7 (Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988). A child might express an incorrect 
"add all" strategy in speech ("2 plus 3 plus 7 plus 7 is 19"), and at the same time, a 
correct "make both sides equal" strategy in gesture (sweeping across the left side of the 
equation while saying “2 plus 3 plus 7”, and then sweeping across the right side while 
saying “plus 7 is 19”; the gestures make the same movement on both sides, expressing 
equality). Such mismatches appear to reflect gestural exploration of information—in this 
case, the fact that equations have two “sides”. Gesture-speech mismatches also occur 
when children explain Piagetian conservation tasks (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986) 
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and other sorts of problem-solving tasks (e.g., Pine, Lufkin & Messer, 2004).  Children 
produce gesture-speech mismatches especially often when learners are in a transition 
phase towards a more advanced understanding (Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Church 
& Goldin-Meadow, 1986; Perry et al., 1988; Pine, Lufkin, & Messer, 2004). 
Furthermore, during transitional knowledge states, children express a wider range of 
solution strategies in gesture than in speech (Goldin-Meadow, Alibali, & Church, 1993), 
suggesting gestural exploration of solution strategies.  
Speakers explore in gestures, as manifested in gesture-speech mismatches, more 
frequently when it is difficult for them to decide what to say. As described in the previous 
section, Alibali, Kita and Young (2000) manipulated difficulty in what information to 
express with an explanation task (more difficult) and a description task (less difficult). 
Children produced more speech-gesture mismatches in the explanation task than in the 
description task. Thus, when it is difficult to decide exactly what information to verbally 
express, people use gesture to seek potentially relevant information. 
Gesture Production Facilitates Exploration of Ideas 
One way to measure how much information people explore is to measure the 
number of relevant ideas that people generate when solving problems. Studies that 
manipulate the availability of gesture have shown that people generate a wider range of 
conceptualizations when they produce gestures than when they do not. For example, 
Broaders and colleagues (2007) investigated whether gesturing leads to generation of 
more solution strategies for mathematical equations such as 2 + 3 + 7 = __ + 7. Children 
explained how they would solve such problems, first in a set of “baseline” problems in 
which gesture was not manipulated, and then in second set of problems in which gesture 
was manipulated. Relative to the baseline phase, children who were encouraged to 
gesture added more new solution strategies during the second set of problems than 
children who were prohibited from gesturing, and these new strategies were almost 
always expressed in gesture and not in speech. That is, gestures explored a wide range of 
conceptual possibilities. 
Along similar lines, Kirk and Lewis (in press) investigated whether children 
produce more creative answers in the Alternative Uses Test (e.g., "list all 
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nonconventional uses of newspaper”, Guilford, 1967) when gesturing. When free to 
move their hands, the more children gestured, the greater the number of valid solutions 
they generated.  Furthermore, encouraging children to move their hands substantially 
increased the number of novel uses that they generated. These findings suggest that 
people used gesture to explore possible affordances of the objects, and this exploration 
allowed them to find more solutions. 
Abandoned Gestures Indicate Unsuccessful Exploration 
People sometimes change their minds about their gestures and abandon them 
prematurely, as if exploring via trial and error in gesture. For example, when participants 
described their solutions to mental rotation problems (Figure 3) in Chu and Kita (2008), 
they sometimes stopped their gestural movements suddenly, as if they changed their 
minds about what information to explore. These stoppages occurred during the stroke 
phase of the gesture, which is the expressive part of the movement, or during the 
preparation phase, in which the speaker brings the hand to the starting position for the 
stroke (see McNeill, 1992, and Kita, van Gijn, & van der Hulst, 1998).  
If abandoned gestures are a sign of unsuccessful exploration, two predictions 
follow. First, these gestures should occur before gestures that reflect successful 
exploration, i.e., non-abandoned gestures. Second, they should occur more often on hard 
problems than on easy ones, because people are more likely to explore possibilities on 
hard problems. A reanalysis of data from Experiment 1 in Chu and Kita (2008) supported 
both predictions3.  
First, participants usually produced abandoned gestures prior to non-abandoned 
gestures within individual trials. For trials with at least one abandoned and one non-
abandoned gesture, we gave a score to each gesture according to its position in the trial 
(e.g., for a trial with three gestures, the first gesture received a score of 1 and the third 
gesture received a score of 3). The mean position score for abandoned gestures (M = 
                                                 
3 This study was conducted under the ethical approval for the project 
“Spontaneous gesture” (Reference number 181005153), granted by the University of 
Bristol Department of Experimental Psychology Human Research Ethics Committee. 
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1.73, SD = 0.80) was significantly lower than that for non-abandoned gestures (M = 2.96, 
SD = 1.22), t (18) = -4.97, p < .001, d = -1.19.  
Second, participants produced abandoned gestures more frequently on harder 
mental rotation problems (i.e., 120 º and 240 º rotation angles; M = 0.92 per minute, SD = 
0.98) than on easier problems (i.e., 60 º and 300 º rotation angles; M = 0.57 per minute, 
SD = 0.60), t (18) = -2.58, p = .019, d = 0.43. Thus, task difficulty elicits gestural 
exploration of information. Further analyses excluded the possibility that these 
abandoned gestures were a consequence of abandoned speech, in which participants 
corrected or repeated their own speech (for these analyses, see the Supplemental 
material). 
Microgenesis of New Ideas in Gesture 
If gesture functions to explore spatio-motoric information, as we suggest, this 
should be reflected in the microgenesis of ideas in gestures. That is, trial and error 
processes should be evident in gesture as speakers generate utterances or approaches to 
solving problems, and these processes should sometimes lead to ideas that are expressed 
in speech or offered as problem solutions. Here we discuss two examples in which 
gestures explore various related ideas, until eventually the speaker finds an idea that is 
appropriate for the task. 
The first example (Figure 4) comes from a speaker narrating an animated cartoon 
she had just seen (data from McNeill, 1992). She is describing a scene in which Sylvester 
(a cat) is running away as he holds Tweety (a bird) in his hand, but a heavy weight, which 
had been catapulted up in the air earlier, comes down on him and crushes him. This 
crushing is important as it allows the story to move forward; it makes Sylvester release 
Tweety, and she escapes.  
In this example, the speaker explores different ways of packaging the crucial 
information—initially representing multiple aspects of the event (the weight flying 
through the air and the weight hitting the cat), and eventually zeroing in on the hitting 
event, which is most crucial to the story line. Her first gesture (Figure 4, left panel) 
depicts both the weight (represented by the left hand) flying through the air in an arc 
trajectory and the weight hitting the cat (represented by the right hand). She just says “uh 
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uhm” while producing this gesture, presumably because the depicted information was too 
complex to be verbally expressed in a single clause. In the second gesture (right panel), 
she “recycled” the final part of the first gesture, and depicted solely the hitting event. 
This time, she produced a full-fledged verbal description: "he gets clobbered by the 
weight".  Her two gestures explored different ways to conceptualize the scene. It appears 
that a relatively small change in the gestural representation led her to focus on the crucial 
hitting event, allowing the discourse to move forward.  
As a second example, consider a boy explaining his judgment to a Piagetian task 
in which the experimenter poured one of two identical, tall glasses of sand into a short, 
wide dish (Figure 5; example from the dataset described in Alibali, et al., 2000). The boy 
claimed that the tall glass now contained more sand than the short dish. In explaining this 
judgment, he began by saying “Cause, um…” and pointed toward the taller glass (Figure 
5, Panel a). However, he quickly abandoned this thought about the tall glass, and shifted 
his attention to the short dish, saying, “the bowl is wi- —cause the bowl is wider.” With 
this utterance, he made a V-shaped gesture with the index and middle fingers of his left 
hand, and moved it down and up repeatedly at the side of the dish, representing its width 
and height (Panel b). As he completed this utterance, while saying the word “wider”, he 
moved his hand into a claw shape over the dish, and spread and closed his fingers (twice), 
representing the area of the top of the dish (Panel c). Notably, the idea of spreading or 
area that he expressed in this gesture goes beyond the notion of width which he said in 
the accompanying speech. He then pulled his hand back into a point toward the dish and 
ultimately back to his body while saying “and it needs um…”. He then concluded, “it 
needs to fill out.” With this final utterance, he repeated the spreading gesture, with his 
hand again moving from a claw shape to a flat hand with fingers spread (Panel d). With 
this gesture he depicted the sand “filling out” a wider area, which occurred when the 
experimenter poured the sand from the glass to the dish.  
In this example, the boy explored many features of the task objects in gesture; he 
(eventually) lexicalized many, but not all, of these features. At the outset, he seemed to 
explore the possibility of saying something about the tall glass, but quickly decided 
against it. He then explored the width and height of the dish, with the up-and-down V 
gesture at the side of the dish. He eventually lexicalized the feature “wider”, but did not 
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ever (in the course of this explanation) lexicalize height (thus producing a gesture-speech 
mismatch). Finally, he explored the area of the dish and the spreading of the sand, using a 
spreading gesture over the dish. He repeated this gesture a total of three times, eventually 
lexicalizing it using the verb “fill out”, on the third iteration of the gesture. Most relevant 
to our point here, many of the features that he eventually lexicalized were expressed first 
in gestures, and only later in speech. We suggest that his gestural exploration of the task 
objects helped him generate the idea that the sand fills out a larger area in the dish than in 
the glass. 
Of course, in both of these examples, one cannot infer that the change in gesture 
caused the change in the speaker’s focus; it remains possible that the gestures simply 
reflect rather than caused that change. Nevertheless, these examples are important in 
illustrating how gestural exploration can unfold over time and can influence verbally 
expressed conceptualizations of events or objects. 
Summary of the Evidence for the Exploration Function 
In summary, several lines of evidence converge to suggest that gesture explores 
information that may be useful for speaking and thinking. The most direct evidence 
comes from studies that manipulated gesturing and showed when people gesture, they 
have access to a wider range of ideas (Broaders et al., 2007; Kirk & Lewis, in press). 
Gestural exploration of ideas is manifested in gesture-speech mismatches, in abandoned 
gestures, and in gestural discovery of novel ideas that are subsequently expressed in 
speech. The key features of these phenomena are that the microgenesis of ideas in gesture 
is, to some extent, independent from (and trailblazing the way for) the microgenesis of 
ideas in speech, and that ideas develop in gesture via a process of trial and error (see 
Goldin-Meadow, Alibali, & Church, 1993; abandoned gestures in re-analysis of Chu & 
Kita, 2008). When people use gestural, spatio-motoric thinking and verbal, propositional 
thinking in parallel, they cast a wider net for possible solutions (Kita, 2000). Engaging 
multiple qualitatively different ways of thinking enriches the conceptual resources that 
come into play. This argument is based on Growth Point theory (McNeill, 1992), which 
proposes that the interplay of two qualitatively different kinds of thinking—gestural 
thinking and verbal thinking—drives the speaker's cognitive processes forward because 
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more diverse ways of conceptualizing information or framing the problem become 
available. 
Relationship among the Four Functions 
We argue that the four proposed functions are distinct from one another; however, 
they can also work together to enhance performance. The four functions can operate 
simultaneously; for example, when a speaker talks and gestures about an object that is no 
longer present, a gesture may both activate and explore spatio-motoric information about 
the object at the same time. Furthermore, the exploration function may be triggered by 
the need for better packaging of information or by the need to manipulate spatio-motoric 
information (e.g., to describe something from the listener’s perspective). 
 We argue that all four functions may operate every time people produce gestures. 
However, the dominant function at any given moment may depend on what is required 
for the task at hand. For example, gesture may be used to explore when novel 
conceptualizations are useful (Kita, 2000)—and gestures that manifest this exploration 
are most frequent when conceptual exploration is useful. In support of this claim, several 
studies have shown that children produce gesture-speech mismatches most frequently 
when they are at the cusp of understanding a task (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986; 
Perry et al., 1988; Pine et al., 2004). 
Gestures are Generated from the Same System that Generates Practical Action 
Why can gesture activate, manipulate, package, and explore spatio-motoric 
information? In addressing this question, we consider the mechanism that gives rise to 
gesture, and its implications for our arguments about gesture function. We argue that 
gesture has these functions because it has roots in practical action. For each gesture that 
indicates body movement, object shape, object movement or object location, there is a 
similar practical action. For example, a gesture that depicts holding a mug to drink is 
similar to grasping a mug to drink, a gesture indicating the round shape of the rim of a 
mug is similar to tracing the rim of a mug, a gesture that tracks the path of a ball is 
similar to tracking the movement of a ball by changing the direction of gaze, a pointing 
gesture to an object location is similar to reaching for an object, and so forth.  
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Practical actions can also serve the four functions that we posited for gestures: 
activating, manipulating, packaging and exploring spatio-motoric information. When 
planning an action in a physical or virtual (imagined or simulated) environment, one 
needs to take into account spatial information in the environment; for example, when the 
hand reaches out to grasp a mug, the location of the mug determines the trajectory of the 
hand and the shape and orientation of the mug afford certain possibilities for grasping 
(Gibson, 1979). In this sense, practical actions can activate spatio-motoric information 
(see Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010, for experimental evidence). The hand can grasp and 
manipulate an object to examine perceptual consequences of the object’s movement; as 
one example, manipulating a mug can help one visualize it from different angles. When 
the hand interacts with an object, only certain features of the object are relevant; for 
example, when grasping the handle of a mug, only the size and orientation of the handle 
are relevant, and when tracing the rim of a mug, only the circular shape and size of the 
opening are relevant. In this sense, practical actions can package information about an 
object. The hand can also explore various possibilities for manually interacting with an 
object; for example, a hand may try out various ways to interact with a mug. Thus, 
practical actions and gestures serve similar functions. 
It is sometimes difficult to draw a line between practical action and gesture when 
the hand interacts with an object for communication (see also Novack & Goldin-
Meadow, 2016). For example, one may demonstrate how to use a tool by producing 
movements with the tool that simulate using the tool (Clark, 1996; Streeck, 1996; 
LeBaron & Streeck, 2000) or one may show how to move or use an object by producing 
an empty-handed action near the object (Novack, Wakefield, & Goldin-Meadow, 2016). 
Some researchers have distinguished between gestures and practical actions or 
“functional acts”, such as picking up or manipulating an object (Goldin-Meadow, 2003). 
In contrast, other researchers have argued that gestures and practical actions are 
functionally similar. For example, in their analyses of teachers’ gestures, Alibali, Nathan 
and Fuijmori (2011) argued that “hold up” gestures (i.e., gestures that display objects by 
holding them up) are functionally similar to deictic gestures because they indicate 
specific referents by bringing those referents into a space where the recipient is likely to 
attend (Clark, 2003). They further argued that “hold-up-plus-action” gestures (i.e., 
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gestures that involve holding up and manipulating objects) are functionally similar to 
representational gestures because they depict meaning through action. To illustrate, one 
of the teachers in their sample was giving a lesson about calculating the area of a triangle; 
as part of this lesson, the teacher held up two identical paper triangles and moved them 
together to illustrate that two triangles form a rectangle (see Figure 6).  
Practical actions produced during thinking have gesture-like properties when the 
hand interacts with objects for reasoning and thinking, as well as for communication. 
Consider an example from the study, described above, in which children were asked to 
describe the task objects used in Piagetian conservation tasks (Alibali et al., 2000). In one 
task, children were shown two identical balls of playdough, and then the experimenter 
flattened one ball into a disk. In describing the task objects, one child said, “One’s 
round,” while rolling the unchanged ball around on the table. In this example, the child’s 
rolling action expressed a physical property of the ball—its spherical shape—by actually 
manipulating the ball. Along with this action, the child expressed the spherical shape in 
speech with the word “round.” The child then continued by saying, “and one’s flat,” and 
indicated the flattened disk with a flat palm gesture facing down over the disk, in this 
case, without manipulating the playdough. Thus, in this part of the utterance, the child 
used a gesture that represented an aspect of the object, but did not manipulate the object. 
In this example, object manipulation and gesture were used in parallel parts of the same 
utterance, suggesting that they are similar in a fundamental way. 
Some theoretical accounts of co-speech gesture production have proposed that 
gestures are generated by the same cognitive processes that also generate practical 
actions. According to the Information Packaging Hypothesis, "what underlies a gesture is 
an action in virtual [imagined] environment" (Kita, 2000, p. 170). Similarly, the Interface 
Hypothesis (Kita, 2014; Kita & Özyürek, 2003) proposes that gestures are generated from 
a general-purpose "action generator", which determines the content of both practical 
actions and representational actions, i.e., gestures. The Gesture as Simulated Action 
framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) holds that the mental representations that underlie 
gestures are simulated actions and perceptual states. In addition to these theories about 
co-speech gestures, the Action Generation Hypothesis (Chu & Kita, 2015) extends the 
same action-based view to co-thought gestures. These theories contrast with theories that 
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embed gesture generation solely within speech production processes (Butterworth & 
Hadar, 1989; de Ruiter, 2000; McNeill, 1992) 
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis builds on the idea that gestures 
are generated from the same process that generates practical actions (cf. Chu & Kita, 
2015; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003). That is, the 
information encoded in gestures is generated from the action system. 
What is the evidence for this link between practical actions and gestures? There 
are three primary lines of evidence. First, people produce more gestures when they think 
or speak about motoric content than when they think or speak about other content, 
because thinking and speaking about such content presumably involves simulating 
actions or movements in space. Indeed, people produce more co-speech gestures when 
they talk about motor imagery (e.g., explain how to wrap a present) than when they talk 
about visual imagery (e.g., describe your favorite painting) or about abstract information 
(e.g., express your view on the use of a single currency in Europe) (Feyereisen & Havard, 
1999). Furthermore, in object description tasks, people produce more co-speech gestures 
when they describe objects that are highly manipulable, such as a stapler, than when they 
describe objects that people do not typically manipulate with their hands, such as a fence 
(Hostetter, 2014; Masson-Carro et al., 2015; Pine, Gurney & Fletcher, 2010). This pattern 
holds, even when controlling for the objects’ spatiality, concreteness, and ability for self-
produced movement (Hostetter, 2014). Moreover, when people describe manipulable 
objects, they tend to produce gestures that depict the physical actions involved in using or 
handling those objects (Masson-Carro et al., 2015).  
Second, when talking about objects, gesture rates are also sensitive to variations 
in the affordances of objects, even when the content of speech does not vary with these 
affordances. Chu and Kita (2015) presented participants with two images of a mug, and 
described how one mug could be rotated into the position of the other. The mugs either 
had smooth surfaces or had spikes on their surfaces (Figure 7). Participants produced 
more co-speech gestures on the smooth mug trials than on the spiky mug trials, even 
though the spikes were irrelevant to the task goal and thus had no impact on the content 
of speech. The same effect of varying affordances was found in co-thought gestures when 
participants silently performed a mental rotation task with either smooth mugs or spiky 
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mugs as the stimulus objects (Figure 8). Thus, gestures were affected by the affordances 
of the stimulus objects in the same way that practical actions would be affected. 
Third, experience with physically manipulating objects influences speakers’ 
gestures. Hostetter and Alibali (2010) examined the gestures people produced when they 
described information (the dot and line patterns in Figure 2c) that they had acquired 
either visually or through physical action. Participants who constructed the patterns 
manually (using wooden disks)—who would therefore be expected to simulate action 
more strongly—produced more co-speech gestures than participants who simply viewed 
the patterns.  
Gestures about actions reflect features of the action that the speaker has 
performed. Cook and Tanenhaus (2009) asked participants to solve Tower of Hanoi 
problems (Newell & Simon, 1972), which involve lifting disks off pegs and moving them 
to other pegs. Participants in a physical action group solved the problems with real 
objects, actually lifting and moving disks. Participants in a computer action group solved 
the same problems on a computer screen, dragging disks with the mouse from one peg to 
another. When participants verbally reported how they had solved the problems, those in 
the physical action group produced more co-speech gestures with grasping hand shapes. 
In addition, the motion trajectories of their gestures were more curved than those of 
speakers in the computer action group. Thus, gesture reflected features of the actions that 
participants had actually performed.  
If gestures are generated from the same system that generates practical action, 
how can we account for the fact that the contents of speech and gesture are highly 
coordinated (McNeill, 1992)? We argue that this occurs because the action generation 
system and the speech production system are highly interactive. As proposed by Kita and 
Özyürek (2003), the two systems can exchange information and align their contents. 
Thus, the contents of concurrent gesture and speech tend to converge. 
 Our hypothesis can also explain cases in which the contents of speech and 
gesture are not fully aligned. In some cases, speakers provide more specific information 
in gesture than in speech. For example, a speaker might produce a swiping gesture while 
saying “cleaning the room”. In other cases, speakers express information in gestures that 
they do not express at all in the accompanying speech. As one example, the boy in Figure 
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5 indicated the taller glass in gesture (Panel a), and also depicted the height of the shorter 
dish in gesture (Panel b), but he never expressed these pieces of information in his spoken 
explanation. When it is advantageous for gesture to explore information possibly relevant 
to the task at hand (Kita, 2000), the pressure to semantically align speech and gesture 
may be relaxed, and speakers may produce gestures that are not redundant with speech. 
Thus, our framework, in which speech and gesture are generated interactively in separate 
processes, is compatible with both semantic integration of speech and gesture (e.g., Kita 
& Özyürek, 2003; McNeill, 1992), and systematic weakening of this integration (e.g., 
Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986).   
Gesture Goes Beyond Practical Action by Schematizing Information 
Although gestures are closely linked to actions, there is a critical difference 
between gesture and action: namely, gestures are representational. Gestures represent the 
world; in most cases, they do not influence, alter, or directly affect the physical world 
(Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2016).  Thus, gestures are somewhat “removed” from 
action—they schematize actions, rather than represent actions veridically (see Annett, 
1990).  
Because gestures are representational, one might expect that gestures would have 
less influence on thought than actions. However, evidence to date points in the opposite 
direction: gestures have a more powerful influence on thought than actions do.  
We argue that gesture’s powerful influence on thought is a consequence of its 
ability to schematize. This schematization is a form of abstraction—that is, it strips away 
some elements, while maintaining others.  In this section, we first present evidence that 
gestures affect thought more strongly than actions do. We then make the case that these 
effects are due to gesture’s ability to schematize information. We then discuss how 
gestural schematization shapes the four functions of gesture.  
Gestures Affect Thought More Strongly than Actions Do 
Four lines of evidence converge on the conclusion that gesture can affect thinking 
more strongly than actions. First, gesture has a stronger influence on solvers’ 
representations of problems than action does. Beilock and Goldin-Meadow (2010) asked 
participants to solve Tower of Hanoi problems with real disks and to explain their 
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solutions. During the explanation phase, participants either verbally explained their 
solutions with gestures (the gesture group) or physically moved the disks to illustrate 
their solutions (the action group). All participants later solved Tower of Hanoi problems 
with real objects again, with half of the participants in each group using the original set of 
disks (the no-switch condition) and the other half using disks whose weights had been 
switched so that the smallest disk was heaviest and the largest disk was lightest (the 
switch condition). The weight change affected how people’s hands were involved in the 
solution: the heaviest disk had to be moved using two hands, whereas the lightest could 
be moved using one hand. Participants in the action group were not affected by the 
weight switch; their solution times were similar in the two conditions. In contrast, 
participants in the gesture group took longer to solve the problem in the switch condition 
than in the no-switch condition. This finding suggests that gesturing about actions exerted 
a stronger influence on how action-relevant information was mentally represented than 
did actually performing the actions. Put another way, weight information was 
incorporated into the schematized spatio-motor representations (one-handed vs. two-
handed movement) that participants constructed in the gesture condition, so the shift in 
weight was more problematic for them.  
Second, gesture facilitates encoding of spatial information more so than practical 
actions do. So, Ching, Lim, Cheng, and Ip (2014) familiarized participants with a 
diagram showing a spatial route. They then removed the diagram and asked participants 
either to rehearse the route with hand gestures in the air (the gesture group), to draw the 
route on a piece of paper (the action group), to mentally visualize the route without 
moving their hands (the mental-simulation group), or to read aloud some random letters 
(the no-rehearse group). All participants were then asked to recall the route verbally. 
Participants in the gesture group recalled more steps correctly than did participants in the 
action group (and those in the gesture and action groups did better than those in the other 
two groups). These results suggest that producing gestures was beneficial for 
participants’ encoding of critical spatial information about the routes. Put another way, 
gesture schematized key information from the routes, leading to robust and durable 
memory for that information. 
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Third, gestures have been found to facilitate generalization of mathematical 
strategies more than actions do. Novack and colleagues (2014) presented children with 
mathematical equations (e.g., 2 + 9 + 4 = __ + 4) on a white board, with the numbers 
covered by matching number magnets. All of the children were then asked to repeat the 
explanation, provided by the experimenter, that both sides of the equation needed to be 
equal. Along with this speech, children were asked to produce actions or gestures. In the 
action condition, children were asked to pick up the magnetized numbers 2 and 9 from 
the left side and move them into the blank on the right side. In two gesture conditions, 
children were asked either to mimic the actions described in the action group but without 
physically moving the numbers (termed a “concrete gesture”), or to point with the fingers 
of one hand to the two digits on the left side and then point to the answer blank (termed 
an “abstract gesture”). In a subsequent test phase, children in both gesture conditions 
performed better than those in the action condition in solving equations with a different 
structure (i.e., with the blank in a different position). Further, children in the abstract-
gesture condition performed better than those in the other conditions in solving equations 
without a repeated addend (e.g., 2 + 5 + 3 = __ + 6). Thus, children who produced 
gestures were more successful than children who performed actions in generalizing the 
knowledge they gained in the training phase to solve structurally different problems, and 
the benefits were greatest for those children whose gestures were more schematic. 
Novack and colleagues concluded that gestures promoted a deeper understanding of 
mathematical equivalence by focusing attention on relevant aspects of the equations and 
abstracting away from irrelevant aspects.  
Fourth, abacus experts can calculate faster without an abacus than with a physical 
abacus, and their calculation is less accurate if they are prohibited from gesturing when 
they calculate without an abacus (Hatano et al., 1977). Thus, gestures allow abacus 
experts to use schematized spatio-motoric information for efficient and accurate 
calculation. Calculation is slower with a physical abacus because the physical objects 
impose constraints that are not relevant to computation (e.g., beads need to move a 
particular distance).   
To summarize, gesture can affect cognition more strongly than practical actions. 
Gesture can leave a stronger memory trace than physical action, both for properties of 
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manipulated objects (Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010) and for visually presented routes 
(So et al., 2014). Furthermore, gesture promotes learning of problem-solving strategies 
that are generalizable to new situations, more so than practical actions (Novack et al., 
2014). In some cases, gesture also manipulates spatial representations (e.g., for abacus 
calculation) more efficiently than practical actions (Hatano et al., 1997). 
Key Differences between Action and Gesture  
 There are several key differences between practical action and gesture. First, 
gesture is always representational (it stands for something else) (Novack & Goldin-
Meadow, 2016), but action is not always so.  On this basis, gesture may influence other 
representations, such as verbal thought, spatial memory and problem-solving strategies, 
more strongly than action (see, e.g., Novack, et al., 2014; So et al., 2014). Second, 
gesture is usually free from the physical constraints that practical actions are subject to. 
This makes gesture more flexible than action in what it represents and how it represents 
than action. Third, gesture usually does not leave a physical trace, but practical action 
often does. Physical traces may help reduce working memory load, but they may also 
constrain how malleable the representation is. Finally, and most crucially, gesture 
schematizes information. We argue that schematization affects mental representations in 
specific ways that shape the four functions, and we discuss this issue in the following 
section.   
Why Do Gestures Affect Thought More than Actions? 
Why does gesture exert a more powerful influence on thought than action itself? 
One possibility, proposed by Goldin-Meadow and Beilock (2010), is that gestures are not 
tied to real objects, as actions are. According to this view, when gesturing, people cannot 
rely on the affordances of the objects to direct their gestures; they must instead actively 
create and maintain spatio-motoric representations of objects in their working memory. In 
contrast, when people act on real objects, the sensorimotor details required for action can 
be embedded in or off-loaded to the environment. Therefore, relative to actions, gesture 
forces people to create richer internal representations of the objects and to build stronger 
links between body movements and thinking. This account can explain why, in the Tower 
of Hanoi task, gesturing leads people to represent the weights of the disks, which are not 
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relevant to the task, more strongly than producing the actions does (Beilock & Goldin-
Meadow, 2010; see also So et al., 2014 for a similar view). However, it is difficult for 
this account to explain gesture's advantage in generalizing strategies (Novack et al., 
2014). 
To explain gesture's advantage over practical action, we argue that gestures enrich 
thinking via a process of schematization. Schematization involves deleting or stripping 
away some elements of a representation, and maintaining others. Gesture schematizes 
actions and perceptual states, and this schematization facilitates cognitive processing in 
three main ways. 
First, as Goldin-Meadow (2015) has argued, schematization facilitates 
generalizing knowledge to new contexts. This occurs because schematic gestural 
representations omit concrete details of actions and action-related features of objects. In 
this way, schematization helps people focus attention on essential elements, and neglect 
irrelevant details that are tied to specific actions or objects (Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 
2016). This schematization makes it easier to transfer the represented information to new 
contexts (Novack et al., 2014).  
Second, schematization makes processing of task-relevant information more 
efficient. Schematized information is “light-weight” and free from physical constraints. 
This makes it more efficient to use the representations, as indicated by studies of route 
memory (So et al., 2014) and mental abacus (Hatano et al., 1977).  
Third, schematization allows representations to be flexible and open to change. 
Schematized representations can be adjusted to become leaner or richer, as suited to the 
task or context at hand. This “modifiability” is partially a consequence of schematized 
information being light-weight and free from physical constraints. Evidence for this 
characteristic comes from a study of the microgenesis of co-thought gestures during 
mental rotation (Chu & Kita, 2008). This study showed that the contents of co-thought 
and co-speech gestures themselves changed over trials: co-thought gestures shed task-
irrelevant information and became less physically bound to the visual stimuli as 
participants gained more experience with the task. A similar pattern has also been 
observed in gear movement prediction problems (Schwartz & Black, 1996) and in the 
qualitative analysis of the micro-genesis of ideas in gestures presented in Figure 4. The 
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speaker’s gestural representation of the cartoon scene evolved from one that contained 
too much information for felicitous verbalization, to one with an appropriate amount of 
information for verbalization.  
Schematized gestural representations can also be elaborated, as needed for the 
task at hand. For example, when solving gear movement prediction problems, people 
often have difficulty understanding that a gear system with an odd number of gears 
arranged in a circle will not move, because the gears will “jam” (Spencer, 2003). When 
people fail on problems with configurations that jam, they sometimes enrich their 
gestural representations of the problems, adding more details about the gears’ 
movements, in order to reason through how the gears will move. Because gestural 
representations are flexible and modifiable, they can be adapted to be richer or leaner, 
depending on the solver’s needs at that moment in time. 
When considering the consequences of schematization, it is important to consider 
what information gesture sheds and what information it retains. There is no evidence, to 
date, that gesture “intelligently” selects information useful for the task goal (unless 
participants are asked to imitate a gesture that is designed to do so, as in Novack et al., 
2014, and Goldin-Meadow et al., 2009). Indeed, gesture sometimes retains information 
that is not useful for the task goal. For example, when telling a story based on an 
animated cartoon, speakers commonly produce gestures that depict motion events in the 
cartoon. Speakers reproduce the left-right direction of motion with high accuracy in 
gesture (e.g., when depicting a protagonist moving to the left in the cartoon, speakers 
tend to make gestures that move to their left), even though speakers never linguistically 
encode left-right direction in this description task, because it is not relevant to the story 
(Kita & Özyürek, 2003). Thus, basic parameters of visual experience may be retained in 
gesture, even when they are irrelevant to the task goal, because the gesturing hand has to 
move in space. Similarly, basic parameters of actions on objects that are irrelevant to the 
task goal may be retained in gestures (e.g., whether a disk was moved with one hand or 
two hands in the Tower of Hanoi task; Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). In general, 
gestural schematization reduces information, but it may also retain some spatio-motoric 
information that is not relevant or useful for the task at hand.  
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Gestures schematize information in specific ways; thus, the extent to which 
gestural schematization is useful for a given task depends on the match between the 
nature of that schematization and task goals. For example, gestures may schematize the 
movement of an object in three ways: (1) tracing the trajectory with a point, (2) by 
moving the hand along the trajectory with a handshape that represents some aspects of 
the object or the surface (which supports the object), (3) the hand depicting grasping of 
the object (Chu & Kita, 2008; Sekine, Wood & Kita, under review). Gestures may 
schematize an object also in three ways: (1) tracing its outline, (2) moving the hands as if 
to touch (sculpt) the object surfaces,  (3) using handshape to represent the shape (e.g., a 
flat hand to represent a flat object) (Masson-Carro et al., 2015; Müller, 1998). Focusing 
only on the trajectory of object movement and abstracting away the object shape may be 
useful when describing rotation of the object, as in Figure 3. However, if the task depends 
crucially on the details of the shape of a moving object (e.g., in the game, Tetris), such 
schematization may not be helpful. In fact, it is not easy for a gesture to represent both 
movement and shape of an object in detail at the same time. Thus, the benefits of gesture 
may be limited for tasks that require both details of movement and details of shape.  
More generally, the benefits of gesture may be especially large when the way gestures 
schematize information happens to be useful for the task at hand. 
How Schematization Shapes the Four Functions of Gestures 
The schematic nature of gestural representation shapes the four basic functions of 
gesture in particular ways. In all cases, information reduction plays a key role.  
First, let us consider the role of schematization in the activation of spatio-motoric 
representations. When thinking about a stimulus or an event, there are often many 
different sorts of information one could focus on, and one must, by necessity, focus on 
some aspects and neglect others. In this sense, encoding inherently involves some form of 
schematization or stripping away of details. We argue that producing gestures helps 
maintain spatio-motoric information, rather than non-spatio-motoric information, in 
encoding of stimuli and events, because gesture involves movement in space. For 
example, when allowed to gesture in solving a gear movement prediction task, people 
focus more on the movements of the gears (a spatio-motoric aspect of the stimulus) than 
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on the number of gears in the array (a non spatio-motoric aspect of the stimulus, Alibali, 
Spencer et al., 2011). We argue that the action of producing gesture may lend additional 
activation to spatio-motoric aspects of a representation of a stimulus or event, or it may 
actually create new spatio-motoric representations, de novo. This puts a focus on spatio-
motoric aspects of situations, stripping away other aspects.  
Next, let us consider manipulating spatio-motoric representations. Manipulating 
images or ideas (for example, rotating, altering, inverting, or taking a different 
perspective) requires one to zero in on and analyze the spatio-motoric information that is 
relevant to that transformation, and schematization via gesture enables this focus and 
analysis. In addition, manipulating information places a heavy load on working memory, 
especially if one must keep track of every detail. If an image or idea is schematized into a 
more “light-weight”, less complex, more stripped-down representation, it will require less 
working memory to manipulate (see Koedinger, Alibali, & Nathan, 2008, for discussion 
of this issue). Thus, gesture facilitates the manipulation of ideas because schematization 
via gesture reduces the amount of information to be processed.  
For the same reason, schematization is also relevant to packaging spatio-motoric 
representation into units for speaking. Not all of the elements of complex visuo-spatial 
events, scenes, or objects can be simultaneously captured in a single utterance or in a 
single step in a reasoning process; instead, one must focus on an appropriate, relevant 
subset of elements at a time—specifically, a subset that is suitable for speaking or 
thinking. Thus, in the same way that a schematized representation is more suitable for 
mental manipulation than a richly detailed representation, a schematized representation is 
more suitable for packaging into units or chunks for speaking or thinking. 
Finally, schematization is also involved in exploring the space of possibilities for 
speaking or thinking. People use gesture to explore different ways of conceptualizing a 
situation. Because gesture schematizes information, this search is efficient and effective. 
That is, schematization via gesture reduces the amount of information being considered at 
any given moment. This "distilled" information can be more easily focused on and 
evaluated for its relevance to the current goal. For example, in thinking about a 
conservation of liquid quantity task, a child faces a rich array of sensory information 
about the task objects, from which gesture might schematize the heights of the containers, 
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the widths of the containers, the pouring of the liquid, or any of a number of other 
features. Each of these features may be relevant for making a judgment and providing an 
explanation. Producing gestures can help to convert this rich array of information into a 
unique landscape of possible schematizations; exploring these schematized possibilities is 
efficient and may readily lead to novel ideas and solutions. For example, the child in 
Figure 5 seems to have generated the notion of area in gesture, and he eventually focused 
on this schematization of the task object in his verbal explanation.   
Discussion 
Summary of the Claims 
We have considered how co-speech and co-thought representational gestures 
influence gesturers’ mental representations and processes in speaking and thinking. We 
proposed the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis. First, representational gesture—
including both co-speech and co-thought gesture— shapes the ways we conceptualize 
information through four basic functions: gesture activates, manipulates, packages and 
explores spatio-motoric representations for the purposes of speaking and thinking. 
Second, the schematic nature of gestural representation shapes these four functions. By 
schematizing spatio-motoric representations for these four functions, gesture facilitates 
cognitive processing and generates novel ideas, strategies and solutions that are easy to 
process, adaptable and generalizable. 
To understand these functions of gesture, it is important to consider how gesture 
is related to practical actions. We take the position that representational gestures are 
generated by the same process that also generates practical actions (Kita, 2000; Kita & 
Özyürek, 2003). That is, gesture is a representational use of the action generation system 
(see also Chu & Kita, 2015; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Hostetter & Boncoddo, in press; 
Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2016). Because gesture originates in the action system, 
gesture can influence thoughts about spatio-motoric information, based on our bodily 
experiences in perceiving and interacting with the world, and about abstract information, 
via the metaphorical use of spatio-motoric information. However, gesture differs from 
practical actions in an important way: gestures are schematic representations (Chu & 
Kita, 2008; de Ruiter, 2000; Novack et al., 2014). Due to schematization, gestural 
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representations (1) focus on essentials and neglect specific details, which facilitates 
generalization to new contexts (Goldin-Meadow, 2015), (2) can be processed efficiently, 
because representations are light-weight and are not bound to physical constraints, and 
(3) are flexible and modifiable, and therefore easy to adapt to the current goal. These 
features of gestural schematization make the activation, manipulation, packaging and 
exploration processes more effective and efficient. That is, schematization via gesture 
focuses on spatio-motoric information, stripping away other types of information 
(activation), makes it possible to efficiently modify representations (manipulation), 
focuses on small chunks of spatio-motoric information appropriate for speaking and 
thinking (packaging), and creates a unique landscape in which information can be 
explored (exploration).  
Relations to Other Theories of Gesture Production 
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
gesture originates from a general-purpose action generator. This assumption aligns with 
claims made in a number of previous theoretical proposals (e.g., Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008; Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Kita, 2014) and in empirical work (e.g., Chu & 
Kita, 2015; Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009; Feyereisen & Havard, 1999; Hostetter, 2014; 
Hostetter & Alibali, 2010; Pine, Gurney & Fletcher, 2010). This view contrasts with 
theoretical proposals that assume that co-speech gesture originates from a sub-process of 
speech production (e.g., Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; McNeill, 1992).  
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization hypothesis goes beyond previous accounts of 
the self-oriented functions of gestures in important ways. The hypothesis unifies 
disparate existing accounts of how gesture affects speaking. Furthermore, it provides a 
unified account for how gesture influences both speaking and thinking, with special 
attention paid to co-thought gesture. Moreover, it proposes four functions for both co-
speech and co-thought gestures, and it specifies how gestural schematization of 
information shapes these four functions. Thus, the proposed framework provides a 
novel, parsimonious and comprehensive theory of the self-oriented functions of 
gestures. In this section, we illustrate how the proposed four functions relate to existing 
proposals on self-oriented functions of gestures. 
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The Gesture-for-Conceptualization hypothesis proposes that gesture activates 
spatio-motoric representations. This function relates to two existing accounts of the self-
oriented functions of co-speech gestures. First, some researchers have argued that co-
speech gestures maintain imagery during linguistic encoding (de Ruiter, 1998; Wesp et 
al., 2001). The activation function in the current proposal essentially encompasses the 
image maintenance hypothesis, in that the image maintenance function is narrower than 
the activation function. According to the image maintenance hypothesis, gesture simply 
boosts the activation of pre-existing imagery. In contrast, the activation function in the 
Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis allows gesture both to boost activation of 
pre-existing spatio-motoric representations and to generate spatio-motoric 
representations that would not have existed otherwise (see Hostetter & Bocoddo, in 
press, for a similar view). That is, gesture can change the content of thought by 
generating new spatio-motoric representations. 
Second, some researchers have argued that co-speech gestures facilitate the 
retrieval of words from the mental lexicon (Hadar & Butterworth, 1997; Krauss et al., 
2000; Rauscher et al., 1996). For example, Krauss and colleagues (2000) suggested that 
spatial or motoric features expressed in gesture may cross-modally prime the equivalent 
features in the speaker’s semantic representation of a word, making that word more 
highly activated and consequently more accessible. The proposed activation function is 
compatible with some versions of the lexical retrieval hypothesis. Specifically, the 
activation function of gesture may boost activation for spatio-motoric features, which in 
turn, via a process of spreading activation, could activate words that are strongly 
associated with those features.   
Note that Krauss et al. (2000) propose that gesture facilitates lexical retrieval 
when gesture activates spatio-motoric features of the semantic representation of a word. 
According to this view, a gesture indicating a round shape could not facilitate retrieval of 
the word cake because “ROUND is not a semantic feature of the word cake” (p. 272). In 
contrast, according to the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, if roundness is 
strongly associated with the concept of cake, then the gesture should facilitate the 
retrieval of the word “cake” via spreading activation. Put another way, according to the 
Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, gestural facilitation of lexical retrieval may be 
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a down-stream effect of gesture activating spatio-motoric representations. This 
perspective provides a potential interpretation for the inconsistent findings in the 
literature regarding gestural facilitation of lexical retrieval—Frick-Horbury and Guttentag 
(1998) and Pine, Bird and Kirk (2007) reported evidence that gesture facilitates lexical 
retrieval, but Beattie and Coughlan (1999) did not. It may be that in some cases, 
participants’ gestures did not activate spatio-motoric features that were strongly 
associated with target words in the word retrieval tasks, so they did not facilitate lexical 
retrieval.  
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization hypothesis also proposes that gesture 
manipulates spatio-motoric representations. This idea stems from our interpretation of 
evidence that producing gestures facilitates mental rotation performance (Chu & Kita, 
2011), mental abacus performance (Hatano et al., 1977), and penetrative thinking (Atit et 
al., 2015).  No existing theories have proposed this function.  
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization hypothesis also proposes that gesture 
packages spatio-motoric representations for thinking and speaking. This idea builds on 
the Information Packaging Hypothesis that has been put forward for co-speech gesture, 
and that has received extensive empirical support (Kita, 2000; Alibali, Kita, & Young, 
2000; see Alibali, Yeo et al., in press, for a review). The current proposal extends this 
idea to thinking more generally, encompassing findings from both co-speech and co-
thought gestures.  
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization hypothesis proposes that gesture explores 
spatio-motoric representations. The idea stems from Kita’s (2000) interpretation of 
speech-gesture mismatches, as a part of the explanation of how gesture searches for 
information in the context of the Information Packaging Hypothesis. The current proposal 
further develops this idea, based on new empirical findings. 
The four functions posited by the Gesture-for-Conceptualization hypothesis may 
also explain evidence that co-speech gesture lightens the cognitive load of speaking (e.g., 
Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Pouw, De Nooijer, Van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 2014). The 
most direct evidence for this idea comes from studies in which speakers explain their 
solutions to mathematical equations, either with or without gesturing, while maintaining 
verbal or visual information in working memory (Cook, Yip, & Goldin-Meadow, 2012; 
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Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Marstaller & Burianova, 2013). Participants recall the 
verbal or visual information better when they gesture during the explanation task. It is 
possible that gesture reduces cognitive load as a down-stream effect of the four functions 
of gestures identified in the current proposal. That is, the explanation task may have been 
made easier because gesture activated, manipulated, packaged or explored spatio-motoric 
representations, and consequently more resources were available for the memory task. 
We argue that we need exactly these four proposed functions (not more, not 
fewer) to explain all the relevant findings in the current literature. However, in this 
regard, we need to consider two, related issues. First, gesture's impact on cognition can 
be described at different levels of analysis.  We have characterized the functions of 
gesture at a behavioral level; however, other approaches may describe functions at other 
levels, such as at the neural level (e.g., stimulating neural processes in one of the cerebral 
hemispheres; Argyirou, Mohr & Kita, in press). There may be other levels of analysis, yet 
to be identified, at which gesture’s functions can be described. Second, the four proposed 
functions can have “down-stream” benefits on other cognitive processes in various ways. 
For example, consider the well-documented benefits of gesture for learning. It has been 
proposed that gesture facilitates learning because it lightens cognitive load or changes 
task representations (Goldin-Meadow & Wagner, 2005). In this vein, gesture may 
facilitate learning by facilitating the processing of spatio-motoric information relevant to 
learning. Learning may especially benefit from gesture’s exploration function, in light of 
the flexible and malleable nature of schematic gestural representation. Producing gestures 
can help learners to discover new conceptualizations of problems and to change their 
problem representations. 
The Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis holds that the schematic nature of 
gestural representation shapes the four functions of gestures in specific ways. First, 
schematization facilitates the generalization of knowledge to new contexts. This role of 
schematization has been discussed by Novack et al. (2014) and Goldin-Meadow (2015). 
The other two roles—making processing more efficient and making representations more 
flexible and open to change—are novel proposals. 
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Gestures about Spatio-Motoric and Abstract Concepts with which We Have No 
Direct Bodily Experience  
Gestures often depict physical events with which we have no direct experience, 
such as movements of molecules (Stieff, 2011) or tectonic plates (Singer, Radinksy & 
Goldman, 2008). Does our theory apply to such gestures, despite our claim that gestures 
are generated from the processes that generate practical actions? We argue that it does. 
The action generation process can plan gestural movements in the “virtual environment” 
(p. 165) that are created as imagery, as well as ones in the physical environment (Kita, 
2000). When molecules or tectonic plates are imagined as manipulable objects, the 
gesturing hand may move as if to grasp and move these objects (Singer et al., 2008; 
Stieff, 2011). We do not see any fundamental differences between such gestures and 
gestures that move as if to grasp and move real objects; thus, our theory should apply to 
both types of gestures. 
Gestures can also metaphorically express abstract concepts (McNeill, 1992; 
Cienki & Müller, 2008); for example, the flow of time can be gesturally expressed as 
movement in space (e.g., Alibali & Nathan, 2011; Kita, Danziger, & Stolz, 2000), the 
magnitudes of numbers can be gesturally expressed via the relative spatial locations of 
fingers or hands (e.g., Weinberg, Fukawa-Conolly & Wiesner, 2015), and having an idea 
can be gesturally expressed as holding an imaginary object in the hand (e.g., Kita, de 
Condappa, & Mohr, 2000). We argue that our theory also applies to metaphoric gestures. 
Because metaphoric gestures depict location, motion and action in schematic ways, just 
as non-metaphoric gestures do, it is parsimonious to assume that these two types of 
gestures are generated by the same mechanism and that they have the same functions.  
Many metaphors link abstract concepts to concrete, spatio-motoric concepts that 
are based on the way our body physically interacts with the environment (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). Metaphoric gestures regularly 
express such spatio-motoric source concepts (see Alibali & Nathan, 2011; Núñez & 
Marghetis, 2014). They can be seen as representational hand movements, acting in the 
“virtual environment” (Kita, 2000, p.165), just like the gestures about molecules and 
tectonic plates mentioned above. Therefore, like non-metaphoric gestures, metaphoric 
gestures should affect abstract concepts by activating, manipulating, packaging and 
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exploring their underlying spatio-motoric representations. In fact, as reviewed above, 
there is evidence that metaphoric gestures activate spatio-motoric representations of 
abstract concepts (Argyriou & Kita, 2013; Argyriou, Mohr & Kita, in press; Beaudoin-
Ryan & Goldin-Meadow, 2014). We suggest that our theory applies to both metaphoric 
and non-metaphoric gestures, though further empirical studies are needed. 
When Do Gestures Hinder or Facilitate? 
To make predictions about whether gesture will be helpful or harmful on a given 
task, relative to not gesturing or relative to action, one must consider the fit between the 
task goals and the kind of schematic spatio-motoric representations that gesture is adept 
at activating or generating. To illustrate this point, let us consider cases in which gesture 
hinders or facilitates problem solving. As discussed above, in gear movement prediction 
problems, producing gestures inhibits solvers’ progression to a more abstract strategy 
based on whether the number of gears is even or odd (Alibali, Spencer et al., 2011). 
Participants were less likely to find this parity-based strategy, which is more efficient, 
when they were allowed to gesture, as compared to when they were prohibited from 
gesturing. In contrast, when solving mental rotation problems, producing gestures led to 
better performance than not producing gestures (Chu & Kita, 2011). We argue that, if 
strategies based on schematic spatio-motoric representations created by gesture are 
appropriate or efficient for the task at hand, gesture should facilitate performance; if not, 
gesture may actually hinder performance. 
Relationship Between Co-Speech Gestures and Co-Thought Gestures 
One key claim of the Gesture-for-Conceptualization hypothesis is that both co-
speech and co-thought gestures are generated from the same system that generates 
practical action. This claim is supported by parallel findings for these two types of 
gestures. First, people produce co-speech gestures more frequently when speaking is 
more challenging, and they produce co-thought gestures more frequently when problem 
solving is more challenging (e.g., for co-speech gestures: Kita & Davies, 2009, Melinger 
& Kita, 2007, Hostetter et al., 2007, Rauscher et al., 1996; Wesp et al., 2001; for co-
thought gestures: Chu & Kita, 2011). Second, people produce both co-speech and co-
thought gestures more frequently when talking or thinking about stimulus objects that 
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afford action more strongly, compared to talking or thinking about objects that afford 
action less strongly (Chu & Kita, 2015; Hostetter, 2014; Masson-Carro et al., 2015; Pine, 
Gurney & Fletcher, 2010). Third, there are parallel changes in co-speech and co-thought 
gestures over the course of learning to solve problems. In a mental rotation task, the 
representational content of both types of gestures changed from more object-anchored 
forms to less object-anchored forms over time, both when people solved the problems 
while speaking aloud and when they solved them silently (Chu & Kita, 2008). Fourth, 
suppressing gestures can lead to less frequent use of problem-solving strategies that 
involve simulating physical movements of objects, and this pattern holds for both co-
speech and co-thought gestures (Alibali, Spencer et al., 2011). Fifth, people who produce 
co-thought gestures more frequently also produce co-speech gestures more frequently 
(Chu & Kita, 2015). Taken together, these parallel findings from diverse paradigms and 
diverse tasks support the claims that both types of gestures originate from the same 
system and that they function in similar ways.  
It should be noted that the co-thought gestures discussed in this paper do not 
include a special type of communicative “silent gestures” that people produce when they 
are required to describe objects, scenes or events in gesture without speech (e.g., Goldin-
Meadow & Brentari, 2016; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008; Özcaliskan, Lucero & Goldin-
Meadow, 2016). These “silent gestures” are produced to replace speech and to fulfill 
communicative functions; the form of these “silent gestures” is largely shaped by 
communicative demands. According to Goldin-Meadow and Brentari (2016), these 
communicative “silent gestures” often have sign-language-like properties, and they are 
discrete in form, with each gesture representing a word-like unit. These communicative 
“silent gestures” are qualitatively different from the co-thought gestures discussed in this 
paper, which serve primarily self-oriented rather than communicative functions.  It 
remains an open question what self-oriented functions such communicative “silent 
gestures” may serve. 
Relationship between Self-Oriented and Communicative Functions of Gestures 
In this paper, we have focused on the self-oriented functions of gesture; however, 
it is undeniable that gesture, especially co-speech gesture, also plays a role in 
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communication (Hostetter, 2011; Kendon, 1994; Streeck, 2009). We agree with the view 
in the literature that the self-oriented and communicative functions of gesture are not 
mutually exclusive (Alibali, Heath, & Myers, 2001; Driskell & Radtke, 2003; Jacobs & 
Garnham, 2007); indeed, the very same gestures that contribute to activating, 
manipulating, packaging, and exploring spatio-motoric information may also 
communicate such information to others.  
There are two ways in which people express themselves through gestures: 
speakers can “give” or “give off” information (Goffman, 1956) in gestures. In the former 
case, speakers deliberately encode information in gestures to be received by the recipient. 
In the latter case, speakers express information in gestures without deliberate 
communicative intent, but the information is nevertheless taken up by the recipient. In 
both cases, gestures may serve both communicative and self-oriented functions. 
Giving information in gesture is apparent when a speaker strategically chooses to 
communicate some information via gesture. Speakers may index their gestures verbally 
(e.g., “it was shaped like this”) or they may simply use gestures that convey rich (and 
relevant) information not expressed in speech. Hostetter and Alibali (2011) suggested that 
speakers who have spatial skills that outstrip their verbal skills may be especially likely to 
use gestures in this way, allowing gesture to do much of the “work” of communicating. 
Speakers also give information in gesture when they are directed to do so, such as in 
experimental settings in which an experimenter instructs participants to produce certain 
gestures (e.g., Novack et al., 2014; Mol & Kita, 2012). Such deliberate gestures influence 
the gesturers’ learning (Novack et al., 2014) and their syntactic packaging of utterances 
(Mol & Kita, 2012); that is, these gestures serve self-oriented functions in both speaking 
and thinking.  
Giving off information in gesture is apparent in children's spontaneous gesture 
during their explanations of Piagetian conservation tasks. As in Figure 5, when 
explaining a judgment in a liquid quantity task, a child might explore the height, width, 
and cross-sectional area of the container in gestures, but focus only on width and area in 
his verbal response. The child’s teacher might detect the information about height that the 
child expresses uniquely in gesture—thus, the child’s gestural exploration may 
communicate to the teacher what is “on his mind”, even though the child did not produce 
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it with intention to communicate (see Goldin-Meadow, Wein & Chang, 1992, for 
evidence that adults do detect information children express uniquely in gesture in 
conservation tasks). The teacher might even go on to adjust his or her ongoing interaction 
with the child to take that information into consideration (see Alibali, Flevares & Goldin-
Meadow, 1997). Thus, these gestures clearly “give off” information. At the same time, 
these gestures serve self-oriented functions. When the availability of gestures is 
manipulated, children’s verbally expressed reasoning is affected (Alibali & Kita, 2010).  
To summarize, gestures can simultaneously serve both self-oriented and 
communicative functions—and this holds, regardless of how strong or explicit the 
communicative motivation for gesture production is. 
Role of Schematization in Communicative Functions of Gesture 
We argue that the schematic nature of gestural representation not only shapes the 
self-oriented functions of gesture, but also influences how the recipient schematizes the 
situation at hand. That is, speakers’ gestures can help their interlocutors to schematize the 
relevant information from a complex spatial display—and this can occur for spatial 
displays that are physical or virtual.  
One setting in which this regularly occurs is in classrooms, where teachers often 
use gesture to help students schematize material in appropriate ways.  For example, 
consider a middle-school mathematics teacher providing a lesson about slope and 
intercept (example drawn from the teacher described in Alibali et al., 2013). In this 
lesson, the teacher had graphed three equations (y = 4x, y = 2x, and y = 2x + 15) all on the 
same graph; note that two of these lines share the same slope (2), and two share the same 
intercept (0). At this point in the lesson, the teacher wished to highlight for his students 
that the slopes of two of the lines were the same. He said, “Take a look at these two 
equations,” (referring to the equations represented by the lines) while producing a gesture 
that schematized the parallelism—that is, the identical slopes—of the two lines (depicted 
in Figure 9). Note that the teacher could have pointed to the intercepts of the two lines or 
to some other point along their length, or he could have gestured to the lines in some 
other way that did not encode their parallelism. But, the key point at this moment in the 
lesson was the fact that the two lines had the same slopes, and this parallelism was what 
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he chose to schematize in his gesture. Moments later, the teacher said, “They run parallel 
to each other” while producing a similar gesture in neutral space (facing towards the 
students), in this case, further schematizing the parallelism of the lines, away from the 
specific instance depicted on the graph. In our view, teachers’ schematizing gestures 
implement a form of instructional “concreteness fading” (Fyfe, McNeil, Son & 
Goldstone, 2014), in the sense that teachers use gesture to guide students to focus only on 
crucial properties of a visual representation (those depicted in gesture) and to ignore 
extraneous details (in this case, the other line on the graph, the intercepts of the lines, the 
axes of the graph, and so forth). Thus, we suggest that teachers’ gestures schematize for 
students what is most relevant at that moment in the unfolding discourse of the lesson. 
Although we do not have data on what the students in this lesson gleaned from the 
teacher’s “parallel” gesture, we argue that, in general, speakers’ gestures have the 
potential to influence, not only their own schematization, but also their listeners’ 
schematization of the topic at hand. 
Indeed, research on children’s language learning demonstrates that speaker’s 
gestures can affect listeners’ schematization of an object or event. Mumford and Kita 
(2014) investigated this process by having an adult speaker use a novel verb (“Look! She 
is blicking”) as children watched a video scene in which a hand moved objects in a 
particular way (pushing strips of cloth) into a particular configuration (vertical stripes). 
The novel verb was ambiguous between two possible referents: acting on objects in a 
particular manner (pushing) or causing the end state (making vertical stripes).  When the 
adult accompanied the novel verb with a gesture that highlighted the manner of action, 
children interpreted the verb as characterizing manner; when the adult accompanied the 
novel verb with a gesture that highlighted the end state, children interpreted the verb as 
referring to making the end state. Thus, when learning a novel verb while watching a 
complex scene, children used the speaker’s gestures to schematize the scene in their 
effort to find the referent of the novel verb. The speaker’s gesture helped children to 
schematize the scene by focusing on only one aspect of the scene. Children who saw 
different gestures (with speech perfectly controlled) schematized the scene in different 
ways, and this led them to make different inferences about the referent. 
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We suggest that speakers’ gestures play a role in listeners’ comprehension that is 
similar to the role of diagrams and other schematic representations in problem solving. 
Diagrams schematize and make explicit spatial aspects of problems; highlighting such 
elements has consequence for how problems are solved (e.g., Bauer & Johnson-Laird, 
1993; Butcher, 2006; Kang, Tversky & Black, 2015). In the same way, speakers’ gestures 
schematize spatio-motoric aspects of the topic at hand, and highlighting such elements 
has consequences for listeners’ understanding.  
To summarize, gestures promote specific ways of schematizing in people who see 
those gestures. We argue that speakers’ gestures foster appropriate ways of schematizing 
complex information in their listeners, and that this is one of the key ways in which 
gesture contributes to communication. 
 Conclusion 
People spontaneously produce gestures both when they speak and, in some cases, 
when they think silently. Though gestures, especially co-speech gestures, can play 
important roles in communication, they are not a mere “output system”, which simply 
externalizes pre-existing mental representations by means of body movements. Instead, 
we argue that gesture has important self-oriented functions. To explain gesture's self-
oriented functions, we have presented the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, 
which holds that (1) gesture activates, manipulates, packages and explores spatio-motoric 
representations for the purposes of speaking and thinking, and (2) gesture schematizes 
information, and this schematization process shapes these four functions. These claims 
are based on the assumption that gesture is a representational use of the general-purpose 
action generation system, which also generates practical actions. Furthermore, according 
to the Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis, gesture’s influence is not confined to 
speaking and reasoning about spatio-motoric information, but also extends to abstract 
domains via metaphoric gestures. Finally, gesture’s influence is not limited to speakers; 
speakers’ schematization of information in gesture influences listeners’ thinking, as well. 
In these ways, gesture plays central role in human cognition. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Two example stimuli from the mental rotation task in Chu and Kita (2011). In 
the left panel, the lower object was rotated from the upper left object 60° about the 
bisector of the horizontal and in-depth axes. In the right panel, the lower object was 
rotated from the upper right object 240° about the bisector of the horizontal and in-depth 
axes. The participant judged whether the lower object was rotated from the upper left or 
the upper right object. 
 
Figure 2. Stimuli from the verbal description tasks in Kita and Davies (2009) (a, b), in 
Hostetter, Alibali & Kita (2007) (c, d), and in Melinger and Kita (2007) (e, f), which 
manipulated difficulty of packaging information for speaking.  The left panels (a, c, e) are 
hard stimuli and the right panels (b, d, f) are easy stimuli.  For (a, b), participants 
described lines contained in each rectangle, ignoring the colors. In (a), the dark lines 
created gestalts that spanned across rectangles and made it difficult to package 
information within each rectangle, whereas in (b), the dark lines did not span across 
rectangles. For (c, d), participants described the location of the dots, ignoring any lines. 
In (c), participants had to package dots into verbalizable units, whereas in (d), the lines 
“pre-packaged” dots into verbalizable units. For (e, f), participants described a route 
through all circles connected by lines. In (e), participants had to decide which of two 
branching routes to take first, whereas in (f) the routes were deterministic.  
 
Figure 3. A stimulus used in the Experiment 1 of Chu and Kita (2008). The left object 
was rotated 60° backwards about the in-depth axis. Participants’ task was to describe how 
the left three-dimensional object could be rotated to the position of the right one (e.g., 
“Rotate it anti-clockwise about the in-depth axis for about 60 degrees.”). 
 
Figure 4. Gestural exploration of information during narrative (example from the 
recording analyzed in McNeill, 1992). The accompanying speech was, “uh uhm (left 
panel), he gets clobbered by the weight (right panel)”. 
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Figure 5. Gestural exploration of information during problem solving (example from the 
dataset reported in Alibali et al., 2000). The accompanying speech was (a) “cause um…”, 
(b) the bowl is wi-, cause the bowl is”, (c) “wider”, (d) “it needs to fill out”. 
 
Figure 6. A "hold-up-plus-action" gesture in which the speaker manipulates an object 
(example from the recordings analyzed by Alibali, Nathan & Fujimori, 2011; permission 
pending). 
 
Figure 7. Two stimulus displays used to elicit co-speech gestures (Chu & Kita, 2015): the 
smooth condition (left panel) and the spiky condition (right panel). The mugs in the left 
panel were highly graspable, whereas the mugs in the right panel were less graspable. 
Participants’ task was to describe the rotation of the mug (e.g., “The mug on the left side 
of the screen was rotated 60° backwards around the horizontal axis.”) 
 
Figure 8. Two stimulus displays used to elicit co-thought gestures (Chu & Kita, 2015): 
the smooth condition (left panel) and the spiky condition (right panel). Participants’ task 
was to judge silently whether the lower mug was rotated from the upper left or the upper 
right mug. In this example, the lower mugs were rotated from the upper left object 60° 
around the bisector of the horizontal and vertical axes. Note that only one side of the 
mugs was painted blue, and the blue patch does not go all the way around the mugs. 
 
Figure 9. A teacher highlighting that the lines for two equations are parallel, while 
saying, “Take a look at these two equations.” The gesture schematizes a specific aspect of 
the lines—their identical slopes— that is crucial at this point in the lesson. 
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